The former question has traditionally been approached in the fashion of the current proponents of the 'human capital' doctrine: for earned-income distribution, it is assumed that education provides the skills which lead to increased reward. Alternatively, as some sociologists have recently argued, education provides the 'socialization' (e.g., docility, punctuality, discipline, etc.) which permits the individual to absorb on-the-job training more readily, a view which equally suggests that the educational process works to increase reward by raising an individual's productivity.
Either way, it follows that if the supply of educated labour could be increased at the expense of uneducated labour, the income inequalities would be reduced. Thus, Barbara Wootton quotes and critically comments on Cannan on this issue as follows: 1 'Forty years ago, in a discussion of the first of these factors [cited to explain the inequality of incomes, i.e., the restriction of supply of educated labour arising from the high cost of the training required], Professor Cannan pointed out that, if differences in earnings are to be reckoned as the return on capital invested in the acquisition of professional skills, such investment must be quite exceptionally remunerative; and it might, indeed, well be asked why money is not "spent in training more young people for the occupations of *superior advantageousness until the competition reduces this excess of 21 advantageousness to nil?" Professor Cannan himself found the answer in the fact that "the conditions of human life have not hitherto allowed the spending of money in this way to become an ordinary investment to which savings can be attracted in the ordinary way by the expectation of interest. They have not done so because society has not thought fit to provide means by which money could be advanced to young people for their training on terms which would make the lenders secure of recovering their money with interest." (Cannan, Wealth (London: King, 1914) p. 199.) In the forty years that have elapsed since these words were written, society has, however, experienced a considerable change of mind upon this question. Today money is not even loaned to young people for their training: it is largely provided free. If Professor Cannan and the economists have the whole truth of the matter, the destruction of the financial barriers to higher education initiated by the Education Act of 1944 should reduce the "excess advantageousness" of professional skills very nearly, if not quite, to nil. But from any such result as this we are still, clearly, a very long way off: and. . . to anticipate any such outcome is to reckon without the formidable social pressures that are at work to prevent it. ' To take another the greater the access to the higher-paid jobs: this could be one of the principal rules of the game, defining the access of different groups to the different jobs. Under this paradigm, which does not in any way attribute higher productivity to more education but merely says that-society works so that the better-paid jobs are given to the more educatedand this may be because of notions of 'fairness' or that 'education should be rewarded'-the effect of shifting the population from the uneducated into the educated category is to filter the educated down into the top jobs of the uneducated, thus lowering the average real income of the uneducated as also of the educated (if we think of only two homogeneous groups, for simplicity).
The net result may well be to widen, rather than narrow, the average-wage differential between the two groups, in contrast to 8. Whether this would also lead to accentuated relative income inequality between the two groups, the Elites and the masses, would depend on the precise model of eduation and labour markets which is deployed, and there seems to be no a priori reason to deduce any result one way or the other. 9. Bowies's paper is quite rich in ideas, and I am concentrating merely on the major empirical test that he sets up and checks out against evidence on rates of return to alternative types of education in a number of LDCs.
10. This, of course, does not 'prove' anything: riceconsumption is also nicely correlated with leftwing politics in India! But there may well be a more meaningful link between literacy and Communist inroads into a constituency than between the latter and rice consumption! Morris-Jones's results were reported by him in a seminar at M.I.T. in early 1972.
It may also be noted that the relationship of literacy to politics has been thought often to go the other way! Thus, the Indian Education Commission had the following to assert: 'In spite of all odds, Indian democracy has given a fairly good account of itself so far. But it will not be permanently viable unless its foundations are deepened by the creation of an educated electorate, a dedicated and competent leadership and the cultivation of essential values like self-control, tolerance, mutual goodwill and consideration for others a11 of which make democracy, not only a form of government, but a way of life. ' It may also be noted that missionary educational activities in the heathen countries were inspired by the notion that education would tilt the now-enlightened to Christianity. Thus, the American missionary, David Allen, wss to write: 'In commencing their operations, missionaria have generally seen the propriety and importance of establishing schools. One reason for them is to educate the minds of the people so that they may be more capable of understanding and appreciating the facts and evidences, the doctrines and duties of the Scriptures. Another reason for them is to increase the influence of missionaries with the people by communicating some advantages which they can appreciate, and by showing that Christianity rests upon an intelligent perception of its doctrines, and contains reasons for the performance of all its duties. And another reason for such education is in its procuring means and opening ways of access to the people, and opportunities for preaching to them.' India: Ancient and Modem (Boston: John P. Jewett and Co., 1856) p. 567.
For a general equilibrium treatment of this issue
, where the labour market is set up so that the educated are given job-preference over the uneducated, education is paid for by the State and undertaken until the expected wage to educated labour equals the expeczed wage to uneducated labour, and the market allows for unemployment-a model which applies to India, 1 believe, see the paper by T. N. Srinivasan and myself, op.cit.
12. The sense of equality is a function with many arguments, and not just income distribution. Aside from the sense of mobility, the arguments would generally include (0) the availability of 'basic' goods to the poor-e.g., the more the basic needs of the poor are satisfied, the more unequal the distribution can be ( The presence of conspicuous consumption by the rich-e.g., the more the rich consume conspicuously, the less acceptable will be any particular degree of income inequality. level of the groups to which the students belong; and the rate of governmental subsidization to higher education will be greater than that to primary education. I now propose to discuss empirical evidence for India which seems to corroborate .the parts of this hypothesis which relate to the differential access of different income-groups to educational opportunity, thanks to differential costs and returns. Sections 2 and 3 discuss these issues for primary and higher education respectively. 1 3 25
Primary education
The little sociological and economic ,evidence which I have been able to find supports the notion that the lowest-income groups typically have not been able to have the same effective access to primary education as the higher-income groups because, for them, (i) the opportunity cost (of labour) of primary education is higher, (ii) the benefit from primary education is lower, (iii) the private rate of return to them from such education is therefore lower, and at the same time (iv) the cost of capital, against which such rate of return must be compared, is higher than for the higher-income and caste groups.
These hypotheses are based on the following assumptions about the lower income groups:
(i) The opportunity cost of labour, resulting from the fact that children of primary-school age cannot work during the time that they attend school, is higher because typically these groups can and do use children of this age in gainful work whereas this is not possible (or allowed) with the other, higher-income groups.14 (ii) The benefits from primary education are lower for these groups again because (a) the probability of finding the rural jobs such as primary schoolteaching, post office and such other jobs requiring primary (and secondary) education is lower for these groups; (b) if higher returns accrue through increased productivity on the farm, it is unlikely to accrue in full to the educated but low-income landless labourer whereas these returns would accrue fully to the educated but richer landholding farmer; and (c) in so far as the higher returns accrue through higher mobility to the urban sector where jobs requiring Table 1 .1 As part of the national effort to raise the lot of untouchables, Harijan (low-caste) students are not only exempt from the 2-annas-per-month school fee but may apply for special scholarships of 1 or 2 rupees per month. But only some Camar families have taken advantage of this opening. Although the Bhangis and Dhobis make up fourteen of the village's 150 families, they have no children in the primary school, and the Kumhars, with seven families, have contributed only one student. Economic and occupational factors seem to be involved here. The group with highest school attendance includes those with the most economic security, especially in the case of the Jats, who are the landownas of the village. It also includes occupational groups (Nai and Khati) whose work does not demand the help of children in the 5-14 age bracket. There is no great demand at present for the services of the barber and carpenter, and in their work children can be of use primarily after twelve years of age. In the case of Kumhars, however, children can be put to work at various unskilled or semiskilled tasks: carrying clay, breaking the clods, adding water, taking care of the donkeys. The same may be said of the Bhangis. Since the struggle for livelihood is serious, it may be hard to spare children in 13. I have not been able to get the evidence to support the two other elements of my hypothesis: (i) the relative ranking of the average income-level of the participants in higher and primary education; and (ii) the relative rates of subsidiaation by the State of higher and primary education. I expect to return to these two aspects later, when I have managed to gather the necessary data in a usable form. I might note here, however, that the hypothesis could be sensitive to whether the subsidy to education is defined per student or as a percentage of total education cost per student. I should also remind the reader that the total, general-equilibrium impact on relative class benefits from education would have to consider both the effects on earned-income distribution (as per Part I) and the distribution of the tax burden implicit in govemmentll subsidy to education. 14. It is worth mentioning here that there are institutionrrl factors which disproportionately affect the opportunity cost of sending children to school among the lowest-income groups. Among these is the pattern of school vacations, for example. As Balogh and other left-wing economists have long observed, the vacations were set in the colonial countries to coincide, as far as possible, with the routines of the ruling country rather than to coincide with the harvesting seasons, as in Europe. The vacations in the primary schools, which are predominantly in the rural areas, thus are not well synchronized in India either with the need to have the children of the small cultivators and landless labourers on the farm during harvests, thus contributing to dropouts and low enrolments of such children from primary education. A parallel is to be found in Robert Coles's eloquent and impassioned study of migrant workers' children in the United Lewis's data and description also strongly suggest that the income levels of the two major castes with high enrohnent rates, the Jats and the Brahmans, as also of the Khatis, are significantly higher than of the low*nrolment castes.
I would expect that these results hold broadly for most parts of India. Also, data on dropouts from primary school should also confirm my general thesis here: even when participation is tried, it may not be carried through to completion, because of the realization that the rates of return are significantly low in relation to cost of capital, by the lower-income and caste groups.16
The available data on enrolment and attendance in primary education, from surveys and census inquiries, indeed underline these conclusions, although the data are not often as sharply defined as one would wish. Table 4 shows that the 'big' farmers sent a higher proportion of children fo school than the 'medium' farmers, these in turn higher than the 'small' and the landless were trailing last. The same conclusion seems to follow from a slightly different statistic. has not been dramatic, it is still substantial in secular areas such as education and that the economic reasons focused on in this paper are clearly the dominant ones today in holding back the access of the poorer and bottom strata to educational opportunities:
The 1930 Situation in Karimpur 'Whenever we have tried to secure for the untouchables some social or economic benefit which seems to us the reasonable right of any member of the community, we have come into conflict with the wills of some of our best Education, Class Structure L? Income Equality latter groups, the participation rates are likely to be linked to the income level. This is because again both the opportunity costs of education would tend to be higher and the benefits lower, the lower the income groups. 23. John Pettengill has remarked to me that if the differential return is due to parental incomes giving more contacts, the higher return is a rent to that differential income level rather than a return to education. This is correct but irrelevant to my argument since I am taking the position that the better job would not have been available without the educational qualification. Except in cases such as where a tycoon can put his illiterate and boorish son into the highest job in his own business and get away with it, the ability to land a better job, thanks to greater influence, requires that the disparity between your own educational qualification and that of your rival with inferior influence appear not excessively conspicuous. Hence, I believe that the education is necessary to enable the influential to earn the rent accruing from the influence; hence, this rent can properly be ascribed as a higher return to education by these income groups.
24. Ideally, the data here, as also in Table 10 for Ceylon, should have been broken down by the level of education among the unemployed, the quality of the degree (e.g., first class, second class, etc.), the length of unemployment, etc., if the hypotheses I am advancing in this paper are to be truly contrasted against facts. has pointed out to me) the capacity of members of the lowest-income families to hold out for better jobs is seriously limited and they must take whatever happens to come by. This may partly account for the fact that Table 9 , for example, does not uniformly support my hypothesis for each class as against the ones above and below it, while showing that the higher classes on the average have lower unemployment rates than the lower classes. All that this means, however, is that these classes are more likely to be getting inferior wages, the more they shift from 'waiting-for-adecent-job' type of unemployment to accepting any job. Thus, the basic argument of this paper remains unaffected.
I should also add one more corroborative piece of evidence, due to Panchamukhi and Panchamukhi. This process of 'overqualification' has not merely the obvious implication that the private and social marginal product of higher-higher education will diverge. It also means, because of the State subsidization that I have pointed out, that those who manage to go further up-thanks to better resources-in the educational ladder, get the advantage of the Statesubsidy and thus also to compete more effectively against the economically less well-endowed.
Yet another consequence of this phenomenon of overqualification has been the effect on the quality of education.
The expansion of higher education, meting out more and higher degrees in a labour market which works by overqualification, leads typically to emasculation of courses so that, to acquire the same knowledge as ten years ago, one has to go to 'school' for more years-a situation which, with sticky wages and costs, implies increasing real costs. At the same time, the objective of maintaining any high-quality educational institutions for pursuit of science at the highest levels becomes steadily more difficult to achieve.27 In this regard, the inherited English model of a university with a federal structure has been the cause of more inefficiency than an American- Public Interest, Fall 1972, pp. 102-3. But, as is typical with conservative intellectuals, Lipset's tone and argumentation suggest that this puts the Communist and the capitalist countries on a par-and only a critical reader will sit back and realize that the degree to which these advantages can be secured via private tuition when income and wealth differentials are dramatically lower is going to be correspondingly lower, in general. discretion and disbelief will generate). On the former question, ir would be wise to withhold full judgement, nor merely in light of the discrepancies between professions and realities which escaped even discriminating
